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Introduction 
This research paper is part of a broader project on law and time. I am in the midst of 
studying the time related concepts and assumptions that structure some of the key 
initiatives in the area of equalities regulation in the UK over the past two decades. 
Time fulfils certain legal and political functions in equalities law and policy, 
establishing the parameters through which a person might claim a legal identity in 
order to argue a discrimination case, for example, or providing a paradigm for 
thinking about the allocation of care responsibilities. Time-related concepts put 
limits on what types of law people can use and what people need to do to access 
rights. For these, and many other reasons, studying the temporal assumptions that 
structure equality laws provides rich material for understanding what we think 
these laws can and should do.  
 
My book-in-progress, tentatively entitled Doing Things with Time: Legal 
Temporalities in Equality Projects, focuses on specific equality projects as instances 
of temporalised law and politics – the unpaid care burden, for example, constituted 
and regulated as a means of balancing time. Yet, far from merely tracing how legal 
concepts and communities symbolise time, or how they use temporal concepts in 
their world-making features, I am also interested in the materialisation of time and 
interconnections between time, matter, form and objects in the making of law. Key 
temporalities within work-life balance law – balance, equilibrium, and flexibility, for 
example – therefore become amenable to inquiry through the actions of documents 
and documentary practices, administrative forms, and the form of law itself in 
materialising time alongside and in relationship with human legal subjects. As 
Michel Serres puts it: ‘Time doesn’t flow; it percolates’ (Latour and Serres 1995, 58). 
With this in mind, we might ask: how has work-life balance percolated? What role 
have human and non-human legal actors played in confabulating this temporal 
form?  
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Work-life balance has been materialised in a variety of different ways, for 
inconsistent and sometimes incommensurable reasons, and, many times, outside of 
the rational, agentic actions of sovereign legal subjects. As a form of legal (and 
policy) temporality, it has emerged, I argue, through specific relationships between 
actors (human and non-human) of different types at a range of levels. As such, the 
intellectual or political purchase of work-life balance, its effectiveness as a response 
(if that is what it is) to questions of social reproduction and gendered dynamics of 
work, and, more importantly perhaps, its epistemological or heuristic status, must 
be questioned a lot more closely as a matter of disaggregated or provisional 
networked relationships, connections, and agencies, rather than through the 
paradigm of coherent (if not wholly effective) policy and legal reform that 
dominates much of the literature to date.  
 
Analysing the strange temporalities of work-life balance provides a way of doing 
this. It provides us with a means to look both at and past balance, to take balance at 
its word, examine its form, and watch how it circulates, but also to be aware of the 
strange currents and ripples it creates. As I hope to demonstrate in this paper, at the 
heart of present regulatory models and policy concepts is a set of understandings of 
time, and specifically temporal equilibrium, that have significant effects, and which 
are materialised in specific ways.  As a feminist labour lawyer, I am concerned with 
analysing the technical legal measures in this area for the social relations that they 
assume and help to constitute. Even the most mundane details of work-life balance 
laws and policies present rich material for understanding bureaucratic 
conceptualisations of gender, time and value. If, as Lisa Adkins argues, temporal 
relations now provide the key ground for feminist theorising (Adkins 2009), our 
attention should turn to what types of temporality structure legal and policy 
engagements with women's working lives.  
 
Legal Temporalities 
Cultural theorist Elizabeth Freeman defines as ‘temporal mechanisms' those social 
and political processes that reproduce norms of the family, citizenship, health, and 
work through the exercise of time (Freeman 2005, 57). In more recent scholarship, 
Freeman has expanded this into a theory of ‘chrono-normativity': what she refers to 
as ‘the use of time to organize individual human bodies toward maximum 
productivity' (Freeman 2011, 3), and also as the ways in which ‘genealogies of 
descent and mundane workings of domestic life interlock through temporal 
schemes' (Freeman 2011, xxii). Some examples of chrono-normativity might include 
the supposedly ‘normal' timeline of childhood, puberty, courtship, marriage, 
children, and retirement, from which we all deviate to greater or lesser extent 
during our lives; or the time of the working day and working week, shaped through 
contestation over labour rights and pay; or the temporal idea, for queers, of ‘coming 
out', for immigrants, of ‘becoming citizens', or for offenders, of ‘doing time'.  
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Temporal Mechanisms or Provocations? 
Work-life balance measures, conceived through critical feminist responses to the 
unequal allocation of undervalued care and the concomitant effects on women of 
labour market segregation, are temporal mechanisms. They challenge chrono-
normativity to the extent that they challenge the hitherto ‘male' time of work: a 
working day facilitated by women's social reproduction.1 Work-life balance is also a 
good example of how social ideas of time have emerged through law itself: work-life 
balance is inherently also a socio-legal concept. Unsurprisingly, however, it has also 
been subject to a number of critiques. Despite the potential of work-life balance 
laws to upset norms of care and work, feminist labour lawyers have argued that 
these mechanisms have instead reasserted gender roles within the family and in 
work and reified the position of women as the key agents for performing the 
‘reconciliation' of work and family life (Fudge and Owens 2006). Legal and policy 
work-life balance initiatives have operated within an ideological matrix of family, 
household, and market relationships which is paradigmatically white (Lung 2010; 
Lewis 2000) middle to high income (Williams 2005), and heteronormative, even as 
attempts to recognise queer family forms have become apparent on the face of some 
legislative reforms (Conaghan and Grabham 2007). In promoting ‘gender-sharing' 
or roles for fathers in care, work-life balance can also be positioned amongst policies 
which increasingly attempt to re-structure normative heterosexuality to maintain a 
concept of privatised social reproduction (Bedford 2009).  
 
So for many, feminist scholarship and activism on social reproduction has not been 
mobilised in effective ways through legal and policy interventions on work-life 
balance, which have not sufficiently re-drawn the conceptual paradigms of labour 
law (e.g. Conaghan 2004). But despite many feminist labour lawyers finding work-
life balance to be a problematic response to gendering processes within labour law, 
it nevertheless has been a fact of life, it has held a certain self-evident truth in the 
field, and it has provided something of a ‘provocation', as Kathi Weeks would put it, 
to think otherwise about women's participation in the paid labour market (Weeks 
2011).  
 
Materialising Law and Time 
It should be possible to hold in place this understanding of work-life balance as 
provocation whilst also analysing the co-constitution of legal and policy 
temporalities as specific, located instances of pragmatic governance or 
governmentality. Yet the question that still remains within this kind of analysis is 
how these temporal mechanisms come about, how they are created. My dilemma is 
how to think about what time looks like and what it does, where it comes from, 
where it goes, when the ontological and agentic field is populated just as much by 
                                                 
1
 Children have often been required to care for adults and others, and to work for pay of 
various types, but their exclusion from most policy on work and care is outside the scope of 
this paper. 
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matter, objects, the non-human, as it is by humans. When agency is the domain 
purely of humans, then time is about history: it’s about the forward or circular 
movement of events or themes, it’s about epochs and narratives. As we know, this is 
a particular theory of agency and time, specifically it is modernity (Latour 1993). As 
hardly needs repeating, Bruno Latour’s task in We Have Never Been Modern, for 
example, has been to provide an account of the condition of modernity and to 
reconstruct the separation between humans and nonhumans in order to arrive at 
what he terms the ‘full constitution’ (Latour 1993, 14). As part of this task, Latour 
takes on what he calls the ‘temporal framework of the moderns’ (Latour 1993, 67), a 
paradigm characterised by the ‘arrow of time’, definitive temporal breaks, and, most 
importantly, the passing of time. Moderns, as Latour puts it, understand time 
passing as if it abolishes all that is left behind, yet they also want to keep, date, save, 
and display the past. This idea of time passing irreversibly is, as such, a technique of 
modernity, a ‘classificatory device’ for evacuating the work that goes into keeping 
the natural and the social separate (Latour 1993, 73). In Latour’s account, the 
concept of time passing requires further interrogation. Furthermore, the modern 
approach to time, nature, and society allows them to hold in place two fields of time: 
one ahistorical field populated by universal and necessary things or forces of nature; 
the other, much more contingent field of human history, detached from things.  
 
Distilling Latour’s work on time down for the purposes of this paper, I think it is 
possible to delineate three propositions. First, time as such is not an overarching 
principle but the identifiable result of a provisional hooking together of elements 
into something that, in modern terms, looks cohesive (but which cohesiveness is 
always failing). Second, the passage of time, no matter how real and tangible its 
effects, is a classificatory device, or technique, which accompanies the moderns’ 
purification of nature and society. Third, temporalities are the result of connecting 
and filing, so that if we change the classification, a new temporality emerges. In 
order to more fully account for nonhumans, however, it also becomes necessary to 
focus on the sorting: 
 
We have never moved either forward or backward. We have always actively 
sorted out elements belonging to different times. We can still sort. It is the 
sorting that makes the times, not the times that make the sorting. Modernism - 
like its anti- and post-modern corollaries - was only the provisional result of 
a selection made by a small number of agents in the name of all. If there are 
more of us who regain the capacity to do our own sorting of the elements 
that belong to our time, we will rediscover the freedom of movement that 
modernism denied us - a freedom that, in fact, we have never really lost. 
(Latour 1993, 76) 
 
Displacing the ontological split between nature and society also unmoors the idea of 
one overarching time and the necessity of time passing. Through the metaphor of 
‘sorting’, Latour introduces a means of tracing the temporalities occasioned by the 
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meetings, connections, juxtapositions of a wide range of elements and agencies, 
human and nonhuman. Time does not push this forward. Instead, out of a teeming, 
knotted mass of human and nonhuman connections, new temporalities emerge and 
act and have effects. 
 
The Legal Temporalities of Work-life Balance 
If time is created through a sorting process, through connections among entities, 
then part of any analysis should include sorting processes that we choose, for 
various reasons, to name as legal. As a route to balancing ‘work' and ‘life', the UK’s 
right to request flexible work contains much of interest for a feminist analysis of 
how legal temporalities are created and sustained. What does it mean, for example, 
that a concept of temporal ‘balance', or labour market equilibrium, lies at the heart 
of bureaucratic and legislative approaches to gendered labour structures?  
 
Resolution: A Reckonable Present 
Marieke De Goede has shown how the socio-technical concept of ‘real time', central 
to finance capitalism, became possible partly through the development of the Dow 
Jones index, which helped to produce ideas of instantaneous adaptive change and 
hedgeable futures (de Goede 2005). A similar ethnographic analysis of work-life 
balance policies and laws might trace the interaction of feminist conceptions of 
social reproduction, time-use surveys, sex discrimination laws and policies, and new 
theories of management such as TQM (total quality management) which valorise 
organisational adaptability and worker responsibilisation (Amoore 2004), to create 
motivating social policy goals of equilibrium and adaptation. The confabulated logic 
of work-life balance, a result of many different influences, seems to be driven by a 
fundamental assumption that the constructed tensions of imbalance or dis-
equilibrium can be resolved. This type of resolution rests on a perceived 
equivalence between different forms and uses of time that at least allows them to be 
measurable on the same scale, so that time spent on social reproduction is 
analogous to time spent in paid employment.  
 
Feminists have long argued that time spent on care or domestic work is equally 
valuable to time spent in the formal economy. Work-life balance policies are one 
logical extension of this argument: if time that has been excluded is to be included in 
some way, then it must be analogised. As the foreword to the recent Modern 
Workplaces consultation put it: 
 
We want to create a society where work and family complement one another. 
One where employers have the flexibility and certainty to recruit and retain 
the skilled labour they need to develop their businesses. And one where 
employees no longer have to choose between a rewarding career and a 
fulfilling home life. (BIS 2011, 2) 
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The horizon of this kind of temporality is not so much the hedgeable future that we 
find in finance capitalism, constructed through notions of risk, which creates a 
forward concept of time and then stretches into it, but an expanded concept of a 
reckonable present which stretches outwards and maintains an assumed 
equilibrium through analogised temporal modes. If ‘real time' requires 
instantaneous change, then work-life balance requires adaptive negotiation.  
 
The point at which this analysis has to engage with law is the point at which we 
assess the significance of legal technique and legal form to such an understanding of 
time. Within the legal and policy sphere in the UK since the early to mid-1990s, 
work-life balance has been mobilised by the idea of empowering employees to 
negotiate flexible working with their employers. The current right to request 
flexible working in the UK's Employment Rights Act 1996 (ERA) allows certain 
employees with responsibility for a child's upbringing, or with other care 
responsibilities, to make a request to alter their working schedule. Under sections 
80F-80I of the ERA, employees have the right to request, but not receive as such, a 
change in their terms and conditions such as a change in working hours, time of 
work, or place of work.  
 
It is important not to ignore the generative functions of legal techniques such as the 
right to request. Since it has been in place, the right has created new means of 
sorting time within the context of employment relations in the UK, and arguably it 
has also created new gendered relations in the workplace. Sara Jain has argued that 
typewriters contributed to a process of heterosexualisation of workplace relations 
in the twentieth century (Jain 2006), and I am in the process of fieldwork which 
aims to assess whether and how documentary practices associated with the right to 
request (such as filling in, submitting, and considering forms) have created new 
gendered and heteronormalised social patterns at work, and new genres of 
temporality. In other words, I am interested in the role of the flexible work request 
form in creating particular, gendered, social relations of time in this area.  These 
temporalities, crucially, do not stem merely from the social interactions that flexible 
work requests engender, but instead are co-constructed through, and constitutive of, 
fragile relations between forms, people, and law. 
 
Furthermore, this documentary route to achieving flexible work as a precursor to 
achieving balance is an interesting mix of private law and legislated right. As such, 
the form of law is just as interesting as the documents it generates. This particular 
form requires an employer to at least consider an employee’s request for a varied 
working arrangement, a consideration that is otherwise not strictly necessary in the 
contractual negotiations that surround the individual employment relationship in 
the UK.2 In this way, UK legal mechanisms of work-life balance are themselves rich 
sources of information about regulatory understandings of gender, value, time, and 
                                                 
2 Thank you to Judy Fudge for helping me to clarify this point. 
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the place of law, questions which are being asked in a range of scholarship in the 
fields of law, anthropology, and governance. In her recent analysis of the 
introduction of a new banking system in Japan, for example, Annelise Riles refers to 
bureaucrats' hopes that a system based on ‘real time' transactions would 
responsibilise banks, leaving a new order to emerge based on ‘market practice' 
(Riles 2011). The idea was that the new technology would encourage banks to 
control their risk-taking practices. This was a specifically bureaucratic vision or 
hope, which relied on bureaucrats' ability to see the banking system as a whole. 
Similarly, successive groups of bureaucrats in the UK's Department for Business, 
Innovation and Skills (BIS), and, I would argue, policy makers, many of them 
feminists, have created a system of delegated negotiations between employers and 
employees in the right to request, through which actions of autonomous and self-
interested market participants are seen to create beneficial or self-correcting 
economic effects at the level of the labour market. I use the term ‘delegated' because 
the right to request flexible work does not amount to a direct right granted by 
legislation to receive a flexible working arrangement as such. It depends on a 
further step, the request, which mobilises a semi-regulated private law process in 
which the role of the employer is central. In other words, it seems that the right to 
request evidences a wish to dis-entangle bureaucratic involvement, or keep it 
partially away from a market which is perceived already to have self-regulating 
functions.  As such the right could evidence an almost Hayekian appreciation of the 
self-regulating functions of private law negotiations, happening in so-called ‘real 
time’ to resolve labour market tensions around the allocation of care responsibilities.  
 
Recent proposed changes to the right to request have universalised the right to 
request and further embedded it within this logic of private ordering. In May 2011, 
in the midst of economic crisis and on the back of a pro-‘austerity' platform, the UK's 
centre-right Coalition government announced a new consultation on reforming 
work-life balance law. Entitled Modern Workplaces, the consultation was the 
government's effort to ‘create a modern workforce for the modern economy'.3 It 
covered four main policy areas: flexible working, flexible parental leave, working 
time and equal pay. Self-consciously aware of perceived shifts in the gendered 
arrangements of work and care, the consultation contained extensive proposals to 
change the administration of maternity and paternity leave, allowing ‘mothers' and 
‘fathers' to share leave between them, extending parental leave (to comply with 
European Union case-law), and introducing changes to the scope and administration 
of flexible working, amongst other things. Significantly, in what might appear to be a 
bold and progressive move, the Coalition government proposed in the Modern 
Workplaces consultation to expand the availability of the current right to request 
flexible work, making it available to all employees, regardless of whether they have 
a care obligation. These proposals are now contained in the Children and Families 
Bill 2013, which is currently making its way through the UK Parliament. 
                                                 
3
 BIS press release, 16 May 2011. 
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This could be seen as a shift to undermine the gendering of care-related requests in 
the workplace. In other words, it could be read as an equality move, albeit based on 
something akin to a formal equality model: if anyone can make a request for flexible 
work, then the gendering of unpaid care is apparently challenged. However, this 
shift is just as much to do with private law and the logic of labour market 
equilibrium as it is to do with shifts in conjugal work and care models. In the 
Parliamentary debates around the Children and Families Bill, government ministers 
persistently adopt the idea of flexible work as economic strategy. Edward Timpson, 
Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Children and Families, for example, put it 
as follows during the second reading of the Bill on 25 February 2013: 
 
We believe that supporting strong families and introducing flexible working 
practices is key to achieving business and economic growth. A new system of 
shared parental leave will support business by creating a more motivated, 
flexible and talented work force. Flexible working will also help widen the 
pool of talent in the labour market, helping to drive growth.4  
 
Now, this rhetoric is not new. It echoes similar rhetoric used by the previous Labour 
governments. However, it is worthy of analysis for what it indicates about how the 
dilemma of unpaid care is conceived at legal and policy levels. The Coalition 
government's rationale appears to be that flexibilising working relations, allowing 
employees some lee-way in determining their own working hours and working 
arrangements, brings talented people into workplaces, creates opportunities, 
promotes economic activity and assists in the creation of growth in the new 
economy. The logic of such a move is neatly aligned with market-oriented 
approaches to labour regulation, in which rational market actors negotiate their 
own optimum terms and conditions. This idea of the market is also infused with an 
understanding of social reproduction which positions the resolution of the care 
dilemma as a key means of promoting economic growth. The Coalition’s policy 
extends Hayek’s emphasis on the spontaneity of market order to social 
reproduction; the idea is to give people the freedom to resolve the contradiction 
between care and work and such individual flexibility will lead to economic growth. . 
 
Flexibility Requests: A Modulated Suspension of Certainty? 
Such a view of the right to request is supported by the fact that pre- and post-
reforms, it still sets no particular temporal standards, as such, around the 
arrangement of working time. Instead, the framework provides a space for 
individuated arrangements with specific, and staged, temporal qualities. The right to 
request process begins with an employee filling in a flexible working request form 
(or similar document) and submitting it to their employer. The employer must then 
call a meeting within twenty eight days to discuss the form, and they must make a 
                                                 
4
 Hansard, Commons Debates, 25 February 2013, column 49. 
feminists@law Vol 4, No 1 (2014) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
9 
 
decision about the request within fourteen days of the meeting. Employers can 
refuse requests only for business reasons outlined in the ERA, for example, if the 
new working pattern would adversely affect quality and performance. If the 
employer refuses a request on incorrect facts, or for a reason that is not listed in 
section 80G ERA, the employee can make a complaint to an Employment Tribunal 
for reconsideration of the original application or for compensation. 
 
The logic of the first part of this process encourages something akin to the 
modulated suspension of certainty that Latour perceives in his ethnographic study 
of the workings of the Conseil D'État. Latour remarks that legal processes within the 
Conseil produce a sort of homeostasis, a sense of everything being covered 
‘completely and seamlessly', unlike scientific processes which leave voids (Latour 
2010, 114). Homeostasis evokes the ability to maintain a constant through the 
adjustment of other features of a system. Arguably the temporal horizon of 
homeostasis does particular work within Latour's analysis. Legal processes, and 
hence conseillers, labour under an obligation to ensure legal predictability (or 
securité juridique). To some, predictability might imply a progressive or 
consolidating temporal narrative: certainty filters in through the ambience in the 
Conseil, is strengthened through legal process, and then finally established in the act 
of judgment. A lack of certainty gives way to a relative sufficiency. But this is not 
how Latour describes it. In fact, on Latour's analysis, legal predictability happens 
through the fabrication of doubt and distancing - in other words, through the 
strategic avoidance of certainty. As Latour puts it, these distancing procedures are 
required so as to ensure that the law ‘has doubted properly' (Latour 2010, 94). 
Having suspended certainty, and indeed actively fabricated doubt, a curious 
completeness takes over law: homeostasis, a type of all-encompassing, self-
adjusting, temporality (Latour 2010, 113), produced through a multitude of 
adjustments and changes in pace. From the present (post-judgment) vantage point, 
the legal principle confirmed through proceedings at the Conseil is as it has always 
been, despite the fact that the entire process was pursued through means of a 
graduated suspension of certainty. 
 
Such a suspension of certainty can be seen in the process of applying for, and 
deciding on, a request for flexible work under the ERA, characterised through time 
periods, the exchange of documents, and the apparent open-minded deliberation of 
the employer. However, according to the ERA, the employer must then make a 
decision within fourteen days of the meeting. At this stage of legal proceedings, the 
decision is final. It either results in an entirely new contract or the reassertion of the 
old contract. In fact, once the new contract exists, the dilemmas that motivated the 
negotiations under the old contract have become impossible to mobilise legally. This 
is definitely not a flexible legal scheme in the normal sense of the word. The right to 
request only provides flexibility to shift to a new, on-going, seemingly permanent 
but legally indeterminate, working regime, and no guarantee, on the face of it, to 
shift back or shift again when required. This technical legal mechanism can only 
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currently be exercised once every twelve months. As such, the employer's 
deliberation, the employee's submission to time periods and form-filling, and the all-
encompassing time of the new contract all contribute to an understanding of the 
flexible work request as inaugurating a type of staged legal homeostasis. This is a 
strange and contradictory legal temporal mechanism: a right to negotiate only, for a 
form of flexibility which leads to a new permanent working arrangement. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
Work-life balance laws and policies, themselves embedded in mutating networks of 
gender, labour, and value, have a range of contradictory logics and significant social 
effects. In the context of the insistent demands of two, perhaps three generations of 
feminists, for example through wages for housework demands, some might argue 
that the stultifying effects of aiming for ‘balance' have ensnared utopian feminist 
visions of re-valuing social reproduction into restrictive practices of negotiation and 
exclusion. Those women who find their way through increasingly complex eligibility 
requirements to claim the right to request flexible work in UK law, for example, are 
met with onerous processes of form-filling, negotiation, and time periods, raising 
concern over the transformative potential of work-life balance laws. Certainly, my 
own approach over recent years has become increasingly critical of ideas of 
‘balance' within feminist or other social policy initiatives.  
 
Scholars who are concerned with questions of social reproduction and labour 
regulation should be mindful of the argument that the ‘real time’ resolution model 
found in legal mechanisms such as the right to request flexible work are no less 
feminist because they are based on a logic of market-oriented solutions. Those of us 
who might wish for more radical solutions to the unpaid care dilemma also need, 
first, to understand how it is that feminist conceptions of social reproduction 
contribute to this hybridised legal mash-up, and second, to accept, to a certain 
degree, that this strange legal-conceptual model is a fact, worthy of close attention 
on its own behalf. It is strange enough, as it is, to be worthy of considerably more 
research attention in terms of its legal form and temporal assumptions. 
 
If we pay this kind of attention to legal work-life balance mechanisms, we find that 
form-filling, negotiation, and legislated time periods are themselves constitutive of 
time. They create (legal) temporalities through a process akin to what Latour would 
term ‘sorting’. As such, whilst I remain critical of legislated work-life balance 
projects, it remains necessary to understand their temporal assumptions and logics. 
The picture that emerges is confusing, involving a range of contradictory temporal 
mechanisms - legalised homeostasis, flexibility through permanence, for example. 
Yet by looking closely at legal technicalities, we can discern much about the 
conceptual logic that affects many of us through influential regulatory strategies. 
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